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Using a variant of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method, I find no evidence that, outside Quebec, 
there was at any point in time between 1970 and 2000, a labour market advantage for Anglophones that 
cannot be explained by a higher relative demand for English skills, whether in the public sector or the 
private sector.  However, I find that in Quebec’s public sector, between 1970 and 2000, Francophones 
enjoyed a wage premium that may have gone beyond language skill considerations and that I cannot 
explain. Such a premium also appears to have been present in Quebec’s private sector in 2000.   
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Utilisant une variante de la méthode de décomposition de Blinder et d’Oaxaca, je trouve aucune 
indication de discrimination salariale contre les francophones sur les marchés du travail à l’extérieur du 
Québec entre 1970 et 2000.  Cependant, je trouve que dans le secteur public au Québec, entre 1970 et 
2000, les francophones ont profité d’une prime salariale qui ne peut pas être complètement expliquée par 
une demande relative plus élevée de travailleurs parlant le français.  Une telle prime semble aussi avoir 
existé dans le secteur privé au Québec en 2000.    
 
 
Mots clés: Disparités salariales entre Francophones et Anglophones,  rendements liés aux 
connaissances linguistiques, discrimination. 
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1.  Introduction 
There is now a considerable body of evidence that the wage gap between Francophones and Anglophones 
has dropped dramatically since 1970.
1  There is also a consensus in the literature that a major cause of this 
drop are higher educational attainment by Francophones, growing control of the Quebec economy by 
Francophones, and the passage of language laws promoting the use of French.   
Most recently, Albouy (2008) finds that the drop in the wage gap in Quebec, which has been 
much more significant than that outside Quebec, has not been due so much to an increase in the wages of 
Francophones, but rather to a substantial decrease in the wages of Anglophones in that province.  In fact, 
Albouy provocatively concludes that policy makers should be careful not to “confuse Francophone gains 
with Anglophone pains” (Albouy 2008, 24) and raises the possibility that Anglophone workers may be 
suffering from reverse discrimination.   Note that this conclusion contrasts sharply with that of another 
recent study, that of  Béland, Forgues et Beaudin (2008), which concludes that since about 1995, workers 
in Quebec, whether Anglophones or Francophones are “ not paid for what they are, but for what they 
do. ”   
Despite the large amount of research about the Francophone-Anglophone wage gap, very little is 
known about the differences between the evolution of this gap in the public sector and that in the private 
sector.
2  There are at least three reasons why this gap might have evolved differently in the two sectors.  
First, there is ample evidence that the wage determination process is different between the public sector 
and the private sector.  In particular, granting that the majority group controls the government, it is much 
easier to make a theoretical case for wage discrimination in the public sector than in the private sector 
because governments, unlike private businesses, are seldom subject to competitive market forces.
3  
                                                 
1 See for example, Boulet and Lavallée (1983), Chiswick and Miller (1988), Bloom and Grenier (1992), Shapiro and 
Stelcner (1997), Vaillancourt, Lemay and Vaillancourt (2007) and Albouy (2008). 
 
2 Among the few studies that compare the Francophone wage gap across sectors are those of Vaillancourt (1988, 
1991) which focus on Quebec and Wilson (1992) which looks at both Quebec and the rest of Canada.  
 
3 See, for example, Gunderson (1979) and Mueller (1999) for studies that compare the wage determination process 
in the private sector with that in the public sector.  Cain (1986) surveys theories of wage discrimination in the   2 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, we should expect language policies to have affected the public 
sector and the private sector very differently as federal and early Quebec language laws (e.g., bill 22) 
were mostly targeted at the public sector, while later laws (e.g., bill 101 in Quebec) directly affected the 
private sector.  In particular, we should expect that the private sector outside Quebec should not have 
been significantly affected by the language laws, while the private sector in Quebec should have been 
affected later than the public sector in Quebec and that outside Quebec.  Third, since Francophones in 
Quebec have historically been more in control of their public sector economy than their private sector 
economy, we should expect the Francophone language gap in Quebec to have been historically much 
smaller in the public sector than in the private sector.  The results in this paper support these contentions.   
Another contribution of this paper is that it introduces a variant of the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition method to net-out the effects of a higher relative demand for a language skill from the 
“unexplained component” of the language gap.  This variant relies on the assumption that in the absence 
of labour market discrimination, similarly skilled bilingual Anglophones and bilingual Francophones 
should earn “similar” wages (as in Béland, Forgues and Beaudin 2008), and can be seen as a bridge 
between language wage gap decomposition estimates that separate unilinguals and bilinguals (e.g., 
Shapiro and Stelcner 1997) and those that do not (e.g., Albouy 2008).     
   This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the data used.  Section 3 presents 
general statistics on the evolution of the Francophone wage gap between 1970 and 2000.  Section 4 
introduces the variant of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method and discusses estimation issues 
related to returns to bilingualism and selection bias.  Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 
discusses instances where bilingual individuals earned significantly less than similarly skilled unilingual 
individuals and Section 7 concludes.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
private sector and the public sector.  I am not aware of studies that compare public/private differences in either 
gender or race based wage differentials.  
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Table 1:  Characteristics of Francophones and Anglophones Wage Earning Men in Canada
† 
Quebec  Outside Quebec 
Public  Private  Public  Private 
 
Fran.  Angl.  Fran.  Angl.  Fran.  Angl.  Fran.  Angl. 
1970: 
  % of language group  9.1  0.5  78.1  9.2  1.6  11.0  11.1  79.3 
  Average wage  $19.9  $20.4  $16.0  $22.4  $19.3  $20.2  $16.6  $18.9 
  Average log-wage  2.90  2.90  2.66  2.95  2.86  2.92  2.69  2.82 
  Average education (yrs)  10.5  11.1  9.4  11.6  11.0  11.4  9.0  10.9 
  Average age (yrs)  39.1  40.3  37.5  40.6  37.7  39.5  37.9  38.7 
  % bilingual  70.2  53.3  54.2  48.3  97.4  6.6  93.6  4.7 
  % CMA  27.8  33.6  31.7  44.9  3.1  11.3  8.2  17.2 
  % immigrants  1.8  13.1  3.7  23.2  1.5  14.3  4.9  16.7 
  Sample size  1,086  122  9,286  2,224  195  2,683  1,322  19,267 
2000: 
  % of language group  16.0  0.5  69.8  2.4  3.3  15.7  10.9  81.4 
  Average wage  $24.8  $24.8  $20.1  $22.2  $23.7  $24.2  $21.9  $22.1 
  Average log-wage  3.12  3.09  2.86  2.91  3.07  3.08  2.90  2.93 
  Average education (yrs)  14.9  15.1  12.8  13.5  14.6  14.9  12.7  13.3 
  Average age (yrs)  43.0  43.7  39.8  40.1  42.0  42.3  40.8  39.2 
  % bilingual  59.8  74.0  49.7  77.5  95.7  12.0  92.3  5.1 
  % CMA  69.8  84.1  60.4  86.0  54.9  61.0  47.2  61.8 
  % immigrants  2.6  18.2  2.2  14.4  5.0  10.2  4.5  9.5 
  Sample size  4,753  346  20,696  1,765  955  11.539  3238  59,818 
†
Men between the ages of 20 and 64, working full-time more than 20 hours a week and more than 26 weeks per year.  
Excludes self-employed and visible minorities.  
 
2.  The data 
The data used in this study is very similar to that used in other studies of the Francophone wage 
gap.
4  To eliminate as many extraneous factors as possible, it is limited to men aged between 20 and 64 
whose mother tongue is either English or French, who work (full-time) more than 20 hours per week and 
more than 26 weeks per year, and who are not self-employed.  Visible minorities are not included.  The 
datasets used are the Public Use Microdata Files on Individuals (PUMFI) from the Canadian Census for 
the years 1970, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000.  The definition of the public sector is based on the 
industry codes in the PUMFI.  The definition has changed over the sample years:  it encompasses Public 
                                                 
4 For example, the data used in this study is the same as that in Albouy (2008) except that it includes workers aged 
60 to 64 and immigrants, but does not include self-employed workers. 
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Administration for the 1971 census, while it encompasses Public Administration/Government Services, 
Education and Health for the other years.  No distinction is made between Federal and “Other” Public 
Administration/Government Services because it is not possible to do so for all sample years.  As a result, 
since the size of the federal public sector has been declining relative to that of the provincial and local 
public sectors over the time period studied, our results will increasingly reflect over time the situation in 
the provincial and local public sectors, which may make policy implications harder to draw. Mean 
characteristics of the 1970 and 2000 samples are reported in Table 1.
5 
 
3.  The Francophone wage gap over time 
I begin by looking at the evolution of the total Francophone wage gap (unadjusted for skills and other 
attributes) between 1970 and 2000.  Table 2 reports the gaps for 1970 and 2000, while Figure 1 also 
graphs the intermediate years.  A positive entry means a Francophone advantage while a negative entry 
means an Anglophone advantage.  It has been noted at several places elsewhere that the overall 
Francophone wage gap in Canada has decreased significantly since the 1970s:  from about 15 points in 
1970 to about 4 points in 2000.    Another fact that has been noted (e.g., Albouy 2008) is that the 
Francophone gap was much larger in Quebec than outside Quebec in 1970 (26 points compared with 12 
points) and that the drop in the gap was much more dramatic in this province:  a 22.7 points drop 
compared with a 10.6 points drop outside Quebec.   
  One thing that has not been noted elsewhere however is that the Francophone wage gap has been 
very different between the public and the private sectors, especially in Quebec, during the 1970-2000 
period.  The most striking result is that while the wage gap was consistently in favour of Anglophones in 
Quebec’s private sector and, albeit to a smaller extent, in both the public and the private sectors outside 
                                                 
5 A word of caution concerning the interpretation of the results for the grouping “Outside Quebec” in this paper:  
given that the majority of Francophones living outside Quebec live in Ontario, the results for the grouping “Outside 
Quebec” strongly reflects the situation of Francophones in Ontario.  However, Grenier (1997) shows that the 
situation of Francophones outside Quebec is not homogeneous and that in particular, the nature and the extent of the 
Francophone wage gap in Ontario is quite different from that in New Brunswick.  
   5 
Quebec, there was essentially no wage gap in Quebec’s public sector over the period studied (see Figure 
1b).  In fact, in some years (e.g., 1990), Francophones enjoyed a statistically significant wage advantage 
in that sector.  
These findings are intriguing.   The rest of this paper provides elements of explanation for this 
state of affairs.  In particular, it examines the effects of observed attributes (e.g., education, experience), 
language skills (i.e., bilingualism) and unobserved factors (e.g., motivation, discrimination against a 
language group) on the Francophone wage gap across sectors and in Quebec and outside Quebec.  
 
Table 2:  Francophone Wage Gaps over Time 
      1970  2000  Difference 
Canada-Overall  -0.153 
(28.0)
***  -0.037 
(9.88)
***  +0.115 
(17.4)
*** 
Quebec           
  Entire economy  -0.260 
(20.5) 
***  -0.033 
(2.38)
***    +0.227 
(12.2)
*** 
    Public sector  0.001 
(0.01)
  0.028 
(0.96)
  +0.027 
(0.49)
 
    Private sector  -0.287 
(21.9)
***  -0.052 
(3.37)
***  +0.236 
(11.7)
*** 
    Difference  0.288 
+(5.84)  
***  0.080 
+(2.41)

























    Difference  0.072 
+(1.95)
**  0.020 
+(1.03)
  -0.052 
(1.26)
 
Notes:  Gap figures are measured in log points.  Absolute t-ratios are in parentheses where 
* is significant at the 10 percent level; ** is significant at the 5 percent level; and *** is 
significant at the 1 percent level.  One-tail tests are used. 
 
4.  A model to explain the Francophone wage gap 
The statistical model used in this paper to explain the Francophone wage gap is a variant of the Blinder-
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Figure 1a:  Quebec vs Outside Quebec         Figure 1b:  Public vs Private Sector 
Figure 1:  Francophone Wage Gap  
4.1  Limits of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition model in explaining wage gaps   
Consider two groups of workers a and b that are differentiated by race, gender or language skills and let Z 
denotes a vector of mean attributes/skills.  Then for a given sample, the mean log wages of group a and 
group b can be written as 
a a a Z w γ =  
and 
b b b Z w γ =  
where 
a γ   and 
b γ  are OLS estimated vectors of returns to attribute/skills.  As a result, the wage gap 
between these two groups can be decomposed as the sum of two components: 
) ( ) ( ) (
b a a b b a b a Z Z Z w w γ γ γ − + − = −          (1) 
The first term of the decomposition is the difference in attributes component (sometimes called the 
“explained” or “predicted” component) of the wage gap.  This component measures the portion of the 
wage gap attributable to difference in observed attributes.  The second term of the decomposition is often 
referred to as the “unexplained” component of the wage gap.  This component reflects differences in 
returns to observed attributes between the two groups of workers. 
Equation (1) is the so-called Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, which has been used in numerous 
studies to explain wage gaps between races, genders or linguistic groups.  The usefulness of this 
decomposition comes in particular from the interpretation that can be given to the unexplained 
component.  For example, in the context of race and gender wage gap studies, if the unexplained 
component is not statistically significantly different from zero (and assuming of course that 
a γ   and 
b γ  
are accurate estimates of the “true” returns to attributes), then one can infer that there is no labour market 
“discrimination.”   8 
 However, a difficulty arises when interpreting the unexplained component in the context of 
language wage gap studies.  The issue is that unlike race or gender, language is a skill and will be 
rewarded according to market supply and demand.  This means that the unexplained component of the 
wage gap—in addition to possibly reflecting labour market discrimination—may also reflect different 
demand for language skills (this point is also made in Albouy 2008).  Take the example of workers 
outside Quebec.  Given the demographics, we would expect that all other things equal, outside Quebec, 
the demand for English speaking individuals would be greater than the demand for French speaking 
individuals.  In other words, we would expect that all other things equal, the returns to skills for 
unilingual Anglophones would be greater than the returns to skills for unilingual Francophones; that is, in 
terms of equation (1), we would expect the unexplained component of the wage gap to be different from 
zero and to the advantage of Anglophones.  And this would have nothing to do with discrimination.  More 
generally though, unlike in the context of gender or race wage gaps, in the context of language wage gaps, 
the unexplained component is meaningless as an indicator of possible labour market discrimination as it 
will generally be different from zero even in the absence of labour market discrimination.   
Another issue related to the use of equation (1) to decompose language wage gaps is the treatment 
of “bilingualism.”  Unlike for other attributes, the size of and the return to this attribute directly depend on 
the relative demand for language skills.  For example, in Canada outside Quebec, one should expect the 
return to bilingualism to be higher for Francophones than for Anglophones and Francophones to be 
relatively more bilingual.   This means that, all other things equal, treating bilingualism the same way as 
other skill attributes in decomposition (1), biases the magnitude of the explained component and that of 
the unexplained component in favour of the minority language group.
6   
                                                 
6 This can be seen as follows.  Suppose bilingualism is a dichotomous variable that takes on a value of one if the 
individual is bilingual and zero otherwise and let superscript a and b in equation (1) respectively refer to 
Francophones and Anglophones.  Using again the example of Canada outside Quebec, we should expect the Z 
variable associated with bilingualism to be greater for Francophones than for Anglophones (thus adding to the 
explained component of the wage gap) and should expect the γ coefficient associated with bilingualism to be greater 
for Francophones than for Anglophones (thus adding to the unexplained component of the wage gap).  In other 
words, all other things equal, we should expect both the explained and the unexplained components to be greater 
than zero for Francophones, that is to be in favour of the minority group.  In that sense, modeling the impact of   9 
The next section modifies the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition model to address these issues.    
 
4.2  A variant of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition model to explain the Francophone wage gap   
We assume that there are four distinct labour markets in Canada:  one for each of the possible 
combinations of the two pairs (Quebec, non-Quebec) and (Public, Private).  We also allow for the 
possibility that the wage determination process within these markets is different between Anglophones 
and Francophones.   
Let the superscripts A and F, and the subscripts Q, O, G and P respectively denote Anglophones, 
Francophones, Quebec, outside-Quebec, Public sector and Private sector; B denote the proportion of 
bilingual individuals in a given sample (for example, 
A
QP B denotes the proportion of Anglophones in 
Quebec’s private sector who are bilingual) and X denote a vector of mean attributes/skills other than 
bilingualism.  Then for a given census year, the mean log wages of a language group in a labour market 










QP X B w β α + =   (2) 
where α  is the return to bilingualism and β  is a vector of returns to the other attributes.   The 
coefficients α  and β  are OLS estimates.  Thus, the Francophone wage gap within a labour market—
Quebec’s private sector labour market for example, can be decomposed as the sum of three components: 
























QP X B B X X w w β β α α β − + − + − = −      (3) 
The first term of the decomposition is the difference in attributes (minus bilingualism) component 
of the wage gap.   The second term of the decomposition is the difference in bilingualism component of 
the wage gap.   One should expect this term to be positive if the returns to bilingualism are high for 
Francophones compared to Anglophones.  Presumably, this term should be positive outside of Quebec 
                                                                                                                                                             
bilingualism on the wage gap the same way as that of every other attribute biases the explained and the unexplained 
components of the wage gap in favour of the minority group.  
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since, given the preponderance of the English language outside Quebec, it is almost a necessity for 
Francophones to be bilingual to be able to work there.  However, this term can be positive or negative in 
Quebec depending on the relative importance of knowing French versus knowing English in that 
province.  The higher the relative demand for French, then the smaller this term should be.  In particular, 
we should expect this term to have decreased after language laws were passed in Quebec.   
The third term in equation (3) represents what I will call the “mother tongue” component of the 
wage gap.  This component reflects differences in returns to observed attributes (other than bilingualism) 
between Francophones and Anglophones.  These differences reflect a wage premium for a particular 
language group and can be due to a number of factors including higher relative demand for a language 
skill, differences in unobserved attributes that are complementary to observed attributes (e.g., motivation) 
or outright language group discrimination.  Following our discussion in the previous section, we should 
expect this component to be different from zero even when there is no discrimination.  In particular, we 
should expect this component to be positive in Quebec (especially after the passing of the language laws) 
and negative outside Quebec to reflect a higher relative demand for French in Quebec and a higher 
relative demand for English outside Quebec.   
 
4.3  Controlling for the effects of relative demand for language skills—The compensated mother 
tongue effect   
As discussed earlier, the mother tongue effect may be influenced by at least three factors: a higher relative 
demand for a language skill, differences in unobserved attributes that are complementary to observed 
attributes or outright discrimination.  Although it is not possible with the model and the data in this paper 
to perfectly distinguish between these factors, we can net-out some of the effects of a higher relative 





QP α α − , and the variations in the mother tongue effect mostly depend on variations in the relative 
demand for language skills (as opposed to other factors), then we should expect two things:  first, we   11 
should expect the estimates of the differential returns to bilingualism to be (strongly) negatively 
correlated with the estimates of the mother tongue effects and, second, we should expect the sum of these 
statistics, that is  










QP QP X β β α α − + − = Ε ,    (4) 
which I call the compensated mother tongue effect for reasons that will become obvious below, to be 
close to zero.  Indeed, using again Quebec’s private sector as an example, if there is a high relative 
demand for French skills, then the mother tongue effect should be positive while the difference in returns 
to bilingualism should be negative since, under such circumstances, the returns to Anglophones learning 
French should be greater than the returns to Francophones learning English.  In other words, under such 
circumstances, we should expect the two terms in (4) to vary in opposite directions; that is, we should 
expect the difference in returns to bilingualism to compensate for the mother tongue effect.   Furthermore, 
if we assume that a bilingual Francophone and a similarly skilled bilingual Anglophone are similar 
workers, as it is implicitly done in Béland, Forgues and Beaudin (2008), then in the absence of language 
group discrimination, they should earn similar wages, which means that  QP Ε  should be equal to zero. 
 
4.4.  Estimation considerations and a caveat 
Eight wage equations must be estimated for each census year:  one Anglophone equation and one 
Francophone equation for each labour market.  Table A1 in the Appendix lists the variables used in the 
analysis with their associated OLS coefficient estimates.  Note that the coefficient estimates are generally 
of the expected signs,
7 except for the estimated return to bilingualism for Anglophones in Quebec’s 
                                                 
7To verify the general validity of the model, I also performed three tests.  First, I tested the hypothesis that the wage 
determination process in the public sector is the same as that in the private sector (using the notation in (3), this is 
the joint test of  F
QP
F
QG α α = ,  A
QP
A








OP α α = ,  F
QP
F
QG β β = ,  A
QP
A








OP β β = ).  This hypothesis was rejected resoundingly:  p-values for Chi-square asymptotically distributed Wald 
statistics are less than 1/1000th of one percent for every census year.  Second, I tested the hypothesis that the wage 
determination process is the same for Francophones and Anglophones (this corresponds to four tests—  A
QG
F




OG β β = ,  A
QP
F




OP β β =  — for each census year).  This hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent level   12 
private sector in 1970 which is negative
8 and may be due to some form of selection bias—knowing an 
additional language should not lower your earnings. 
 
4.4.1  Bilingualism and selection bias 
More generally, as pointed out in Albouy (2008), since bilinguals typically have better observable skills 
than unilinguals, they may also have better unobserved skills, which would lead to an upward bias in the 
estimated return to bilingualism.   For the purpose of this paper though, in particular for measuring 
accurately the compensated mother tongue effect, what is key is not so much whether such selection bias 
exists, but whether it is significantly different for Anglophones than for Francophones—that is, the extent 




QP α α −  reflect relative demands for language skills as opposed to selection 
biases.  A way to ascertain this is by calculating the correlation coefficients between these estimates and 
the mother tongue effects.  Following our previous discussion, if these correlation coefficients are 




QP α α − —and that variations in 
the mother tongue effects for that matter—mostly reflect variations in relative demand for language skills 
and are therefore not significantly affected by selection biases.  Indeed, this is what I find in every labour 
market studied in this paper:  the coefficient of correlation varies between -0.70 in Quebec’s public sector 
and -0.97 in the public sector outside Quebec.
9  
                                                                                                                                                             
in 7 of the 12 public sector regressions and in all of the private sector regressions.  Finally, I tested the assumption 
that the wage determination process for Anglophones and Francophones differ only up to a fixed effect—an 
assumption made for example by Béland, Forgues and Beaudin (2008).  This assumption was rejected at the 5 
percent level in 7 of the 12 public sector regressions and in 10 of the 12 private sector regressions.   
 
8 The return to bilingualism is also negative for Anglophones in Quebec’s public sector in 1985 and in Quebec’s 
private sector in 1990, but not statistically significantly. 
 
9 Comparing correlation coefficients does not test for the possibility that the difference in returns to bilingualism due 
to selection bias could have been constant over time.  However, the only instance where the regression of the 




QP α α − on the mother tongue effects does not yield a constant term statistically significantly 
different from zero is the case of the public sector in Quebec, and this constant term probably reflects something else 
than a constant difference in selection biases.  Indeed, since there were significant variations in the relative observed 
skills of Anglophones and Francophones in that labour market (especially between 1970 and 1980), one should 
expect that there were significant variations in the relative unobserved skills as well, which goes against the 
possibility that the difference in selection biases was constant.   13 
 
4.4.2    Self-selection bias 
A perennial issue in wage discrimination studies is how to account for self-selection and this study is no 
exception to that.  In particular, given the flow of Anglophones out of Quebec from the mid 1970s 
onwards, a legitimate question is whether these were the “best” Anglophones (see Albouy 2008).  If this 
was the case, then the estimates of the compensated mother tongue effects would be biased upwards in 
Quebec (from 1980 onwards), meaning that one could conclude that Anglophones were discriminated 
against in Quebec while actually they were not.   
Another instance of possible self-selection is the choice between working in the public sector or 
in the private sector.  Indeed, one could argue that Francophones are positively selected in the public 
sector (much as they are perceived to be in France), while Anglophones are not as positively selected, or 
possibly negatively selected.  In this case, for example, the compensated mother tongue effect would be 
biased upwards in the public sector, which would suggest discrimination against Anglophones while 
actually there would not be.
10   
 I will basically follow two (albeit imperfect) strategies to gauge the importance of potential self-
selection biases:  I will use relative observable skills as a proxy for relative unobservable skills (and 
therefore self-selection) and I will compare the wages that individuals earn in their actual labour markets 
with what they would earn if they worked in alternative labour markets.   
 
4.4.3  A caveat 
A key assumption for the compensated mother tongue effect to be equal to zero is that bilingual 
Francophones and bilingual Anglophones with the same skills are, to a large extent, similar workers and 
                                                                                                                                                             
   
10 To correct for possible sample selection bias associated with the choice between working in the public and 
working in the private sector, I estimated the decomposition (3) using coefficients estimated by switching regression 
models (see Maddala, 1983).  Because the results are very similar to those in Table 3 and Table 4, and because of 
concerns about the reliability of such estimates (see for example, Manski, 1989), they are not reported here.  They 
are however available from the author. 
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should thus be paid similar wages.  However, Vaillancourt, Lemay and Vaillancourt (2007) argue that 
they are not similar workers.  Their point is that bilingual Anglophones will know English better than 
bilingual Francophones, but bilingual Francophones will know French better than bilingual Anglophones.  
As a result, according to them, we should expect that in a labour market where French-language skills 
command higher returns than English-language skills (e.g., Quebec), bilingual Francophones should earn 
more than equivalently skilled bilingual Anglophones and vice-versa in a market where English-language 
skills command higher returns than French-language skills (e.g., outside Quebec).  In other words, if they 
are correct, we should expect the compensated mother tongue effect to be positive for Francophones in 
Quebec and for Anglophones outside Quebec.  This is a testable hypothesis that I empirically address in 
Section 6.  Meanwhile, I will keep this caveat in mind when drawing conclusions about labour market 
discrimination from estimated mother tongue effects.  
 
5.  Sources of the Francophone wage gap 
Wage gap decompositions for 1970 and 2000 and the differences between sectors are presented in Tables 
3 and 4 and in Figures 2 and 3 for intermediate years.  Changes between 1970 and 2000 are reported in 
Table 5.  We see that the sources and the evolution of the Francophone wage gap greatly vary across 
labour markets.   
 
5.1  The Francophone wage gap in Quebec’s public sector 
As pointed out earlier, between 1970 and 2000, Quebec’s public sector is the only labour market studied 
where the wage gap was consistently is favour of Francophones.  A striking result is that the mother 
tongue effect explains all of this.  Indeed, unlike in any other labour market in Canada, Francophones in 
Quebec’s public sector were consistently paid as well as and often significantly better than similarly 
skilled Anglophones:   as much as 13.7 points better in 1990 and 9.2 points in 1995 (see Figure 2a).  A  
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Public  Private  Difference  Entire 
economy 
Public  Private  Difference   
Quebec-1970  Quebec-2000 
Observed gap  -0.260
(20.5)
*** 

























Difference in attributes gap  -0.161 
(18.9)
***  -0.059 
(2.89)
***  -0.174 
(18.8)
***  0.115 
(5.05)
***  -0.063 
(7.48)
***  -0.006 
(0.38)
  -0.084 
(8.28)
***  0.078 
(4.33)
*** 
  Education effect   -0.118 
(15.9)
***  -0.046 
(6.67) 
***  -0.123 
(15.1)
***  0.078 
(7.29)
***  -0.029 
(11.0)
***  -0.011 
(4.79)
***  -0.036 
(9.59)
***  0.025 
(5.70)
*** 
  Other effects
‡  -0.043 
(5.36)
***  -0.013 
(0.07)
  -0.051 
(5.88)
***  0.037 
(1.70)
**  -0.034 
(3.84)
***  0.005 
(0.37)
  -0.048 
(4.85)
***  0.053 
(2.82)
*** 
Bilingualism effect  0.082 
(7.78)
***  0.046 
(1.15)
  0.077 
(7.06)
***  -0.030 
(0.73)
  -0.010 
(0.45)
  0.027 
(0.70)
  -0.014 
(0.57)




F α ˆ   0.125 
(13.9)
***  0.083 
(3.34)
***  0.118 
(12.5)
***  -0.035 
(1.32)
*  0.060 
(9.79)
***  0.067 
(5.73)
***  0.058 
(8.16)




A α ˆ   -0.026 
(1.36)
*  0.023 
(0.33)
  -0.026 
(1.33)
*  0.049 
(0.69)
  0.053 
(1.92)
**  0.018 
(0.34)
  0.055 
(1.74)
**  -0.038 
(0.62)
 
Mother tongue effect  -0.181 
(11.0)
***  0.014 
(0.23)
  -0.190 
(11.0)
***  0.203 
(3.23)
***  0.040 
(1.57)
*  0.007 
(0.14)
  0.047 
(1.59)
*  -0.40 
(1.27)
 
Compensated mother tongue effect  -0.030 
(1.85)
**  0.074 
(1.55)
*  -0.045 
(2.64)
***  0.119 
(2.35)
***  0.047 
(3.02)
***  0.056 
(1.84)
**  0.049 
(2.71)




 Gap figures are measured in log points.  Absolute t-ratios are in parentheses where * is significant at the 10 percent level; ** is significant at the 5 percent level; 
and *** is significant at the 1 percent level.  One-tail tests are used. 
‡
 Include Potential experience, Occupation, Immigration and CMA effects.    16 





Public  Private  Difference  Entire 
economy 
Public  Private  Difference   
Outside Quebec-1970  Outside Quebec-2000 
Observed gap  -0.120 
(9.07)
*** 
  -0.058 
(1.73)






















Difference in attributes gap  -0.113 
(51.1)
***  -0.078 
(16.2)
***  -0.123 
(47.9)
***  0.045 
(8.24)
***  -0.030 
(24.8)
***  -0.032 
(14.9)
***  -0.044 
(29.9)
***  0.013 
(4.85)
*** 
  Education effect   -0.087 
(42.2)
***  -0.025 
(23.4)
***  -0.092 
(36.8)
***  0.067 
(24.8)
***  -0.019 
(51.1)
***  -0.016 
(20.9)
***  -0.027 
(44.9)
***  0.011 
(11.3)
*** 
  Other effects
‡  -0.026 
(13.1)
***  -0.054 
(11.5)
***  -0.032 
(21.6)
***  -0.022 
(4.24)
***  -0.011 
(8.90)
***  -0.016 
(7.34)
***  -0.017 
(11.3)
***  0.002 
(0.60)
 
Bilingualism effect  0.124 
(2.59)
***  0.090 
(0.58)
  0.113 
(2.28)
**  -0.023 
(0.14)
  0.048 
(1.54)
*  0.058 
(0.69)
  0.044 
(1.33)




F α ˆ   0.132 
(2.59)
***  0.092 
(0.58)
  0.121 
(2.28)
**  -0.028 
(0.17)
  0.052 
(1.57)
*  0.064 
(0.73)
  0.048 
(1.34)




A α ˆ   0.003 
(0.20)
  0.000 
(0.01)
  0.005 
(0.27)
  -0.004 
(0.13)
  0.016 
(2.02)
**  0.029 
(2.26)
***  0.009 
(0.92)
  0.020 
(1.20)
 
Mother tongue effect  -0.131 
(2.65)
***  -0.070 
(0.45)
  -0.119 
(2.33)
***  0.049 
(0.30)
  -0.031 
(0.96)
  -0.035 
(0.40)
  -0.028 
(0.80)
  -0.007 
(0.08)
 
Compensated mother tongue effect  0.002 
(0.13)
  0.022 
(0.61)
  -0.003 
(0.15)
  0.025 
(0.61)
   -0.005 
(0.43)
  0.000 
(0.50)
**  0.011 
(0.79)




 Gap figures are measured in log points.  Absolute t-ratios are in parentheses where * is significant at the 10 percent level; ** is significant at the 5 percent level; 
and *** is significant at the 1 percent level.  One-tail tests are used. 
‡
 Include Potential experience, Occupation, Immigration and CMA effects.  For Outside Quebec, Other effects also include regional fixed effects (i.e., B.C., 
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Figure 2:  Wage Gap Decomposition—Quebec  
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Figure 3:  Wage Gap Decomposition—Outside Quebec  
Figure 3a:  Public Sector  Figure 3b:  Private Sector 
 1970                                   1980                                1990                                  2000 










Public Sector-Francophones Public Sector-Anglophones
Private Sector-Francophones Private Sector-Anglophones
 
   
 











Public Sector-Francophones Public Sector-Anglophones
Private Sector-Francophones Private Sector-Anglophones
 
 
Figure 4:  Bilingualism in Quebec  
Figure 4a:  Returns to Bilingualism   Figure 4b:  Percentage Bilingual 
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legitimate question is whether this premium for Francophones just reflected a higher relative demand for 
French skills—possibly as a response to Quebec language laws
11—or  whether other factors were at play.  
 
5.1.1 An unexplained premium for Francophones  
There is some evidence that there might have been a higher relative demand for French language skills in 
Quebec’s public sector between 1970 and 2000, which could have contributed to a wage premium for 
Francophones.     
•  Between 1970 and 1985 the quality of Francophone workers seems to have declined relative to 
that of Anglophones (as indicated by the decrease in the attributes component of the wage gap 
between 1970 and 1985), which would be consistent with an increase in the relative demand for 
Francophone workers. 
•  Both the returns to knowing English for Francophones and the proportion of bilingual 
Francophones in this labour market declined between 1970 and 2000 (see Figure 4). 
•  The proportion of bilingual Anglophones increased during that time period (see Figure 4b). 
However, there is also evidence that a higher relative demand for French cannot alone explain why the 
mother tongue effect was consistently in favour of Francophones; other factors must have been at play. 
•  If there had been a higher relative demand for French, then one should expect that the return to 
bilingualism for Anglophones would have generally been positive during that time period.  But 
this was not the case—the return to bilingualism for Anglophones was significantly greater than 
zero only in 1995. 
•  If the mother tongue effect only reflected a higher relative demand for Francophone skills during 
that period, then, as discussed in Section 4.3, one should expect that a bilingual Anglophone 
should have earned approximately the same wage as a similarly skilled bilingual Francophone.  
In other words, we should expect the compensated mother tongue effect to have been close to 
                                                 
11 The effects of language laws on the preference for Francophones in Quebec’s public sector may have also been 
leveraged by the rapid growth of that sector in the 1970s and 1980s.  It is plausible that the need to hire large 
numbers of individuals who could speak French put a premium on Francophones.    
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zero.  However, it was actually statistically significantly to the advantage of Francophones for all 
years except 1995 (see Figure 5).
12  The magnitude of this advantage (about 10 points on average 
if we exclude 1995) makes it dubious that it is only due “bilingual Anglophones not being the 
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What were the other factors at play is unclear.   In particular, there is no evidence that Francophones had 
superior unobservable attributes than Anglophones.  In fact, some evidence would suggest the opposite:  
key observed skills of Francophones working in the public sector were generally lower than those of 
                                                 
12 The reasons for the abrupt increase in returns to bilingualism for Anglophones in Quebec’s public sector and the 
associated drop in the compensated mother tongue effect in the early 1990s are unclear.  I am not aware of any 
evidence that there was at that point in time a concerted campaign to increase the representation of Anglophones in 
the public sector in Quebec in advance of the 1995 referendum on sovereignty. 
 
Figure 5:  Compensated Mother Tongue Effects 
  
1970                                 1980                                  1990                                 2000 
Year   22 
Anglophones (as manifested by the negative sign of the attribute component of the wage gap in that labour 
market).  It is also difficult to argue convincingly that Francophones had superior unobservable skills 
because they were positively selected in that labour market since, according to Figure 6, Anglophones 
seem to have been positively selected as well (at least since 1980):  for both language groups, the average 
levels of education and experience were generally higher in the public sector than in the private sector.  
Finally, the fact that most of the head office jobs in Quebec’s public sector are in Quebec City while most 
Anglophones live in Montreal does not provide a satisfactory explanation either as the compensated 






























Francophones-Education Level Francophones-Experience Level
Anglophones-Education Level Anglophones-Experience Level
 
      1970                                 1980                                    1990                                   2000 
                                                                   Year 
Figure 6:  Public Sector vs Private Sector                                 
(Selected Skills, Quebec) 
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5.2  The Francophone wage gap in Quebec’s private sector 
The evolution of the Francophone-Anglophone wage differential in the private sector in Quebec between 
1970 and 2000 was nothing short of dramatic.
 13  The wage advantage that stood at almost 28.7 points in 
favour of Anglophones in 1970 was reduced to 5.1 points in 2000—a 23.6 point drop.  While part of the 
drop is due to Francophones having improved their skills during that time period, most of the drop was  
due to changes in the mother tongue effect:  it went from being significantly negative in 1970 (an 
Anglophone advantage) to being significantly positive in 2000 (a Francophone advantage).    
 
5.2.1  An unexplained premium for Anglophones in 1970 
In 1970, in Quebec, the wage situation of Francophones relative to that of Anglophones was very different 
in the private sector from that in the public sector.  While the wage gap in the public sector was basically 
non-existent, it was 28.7 points to the advantage of Anglophones in the private sector (see Table 3).  A 
number of factors were at play.  One of these is that Francophones in the private sector were significantly 
less skilled (principally less educated) than their counterparts in the public sector—that accounts for 11.5 
points of the differential in the gap.  A much more significant factor though is the difference in the mother 
tongue effects:  while in the public sector, the mother tongue effect was slightly to the advantage of 
Francophones, it was very significantly to the advantage of Anglophones in the private sector.  In fact, I 
estimate that in this sector, Francophones were paid on average about 19 percent less than similarly skilled 
Anglophones, suggesting a strong labour market premium for Anglophones. 
As discussed in other papers (e.g., Shapiro and Stelcner 1997; Vaillancourt, Lemay and 
Vaillancourt 2007), one possible reason for this premium is that although the language of the majority in 
Quebec was French, there was probably a higher relative demand for English skills because of 
Anglophones’ greater ownership of the Quebec private economy.  This paper provides further evidence of 
                                                 
13 Since most of the economy is private, a number of the results reported in this section may seem similar to those 
reported in studies of Quebec’s entire economy (e.g., Shapiro and Stelcner 1997;  Vaillancourt, Lemay and 
Vaillancourt 2007;  Béland, Forgues et Beaudin 2008 and Albouy 2008).   However, the magnitude of these results is 
sometimes quite different.  In particular, because the Francophone wage gap in the public sector is very different 
from that in the private sector, estimates for the whole economy generally understate the situation in the private 
sector.  For example, for 2000, the observed gap for the entire economy is 50 percent smaller than that for the private 
sector:  -3.3 points compared with -5.1 points.    The interpretation of the results in this paper is also quite different 
given that a different decomposition methodology is used to explain the wage gap.   
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that:  I estimate that the return to bilingualism was about 11.8 percent for Francophones, the highest it ever 
was for Quebec for the years studied and almost as much as it was for Francophones in the private sector 
outside Quebec in that year.  Further evidence of a higher relative demand for English than French is that 
there was no incentive for Anglophones to become bilingual—the return to bilingualism for them was -2.6 
points (statistically significant at the 10-percent level).     
  In spite of the return to bilingualism for Francophones being very high, it could not offset the 
premium for Anglophones in that labour market.  Indeed, while a bilingual Francophone could expect to 
earn almost 12 per cent more than a similarly skilled unilingual Francophone in 1970, he was still earning 
about 7.2  percent less than a similarly skilled unilingual Anglophone and about 4.5 percent less than a 
similarly skilled bilingual Anglophone (see Table 3).   
To assess the possibility that Anglophones in this labour market had relatively better wages 
because they were positively selected, I compared their wages with those of their counterparts outside 




QP w w −  and found that controlling for 
bilingualism, Anglophones in the private sector in Quebec were earning 5.6  percent more than similarly 
skilled Anglophones in the private sector outside Quebec (statistically significant with a p-value of 0.003).  
To control for the possibility that this result was due to the fact that there were relatively more head-
offices in Montreal at that time (which would provide a reason for positive selection), I performed two 
tests:  first, I decomposed the wage gap between Anglophones in the private sector in Quebec and their 




QP w w − ), but omitting observations from Montreal and 
Toronto;
14 and, second, I decomposed the Francophone wage gap in Quebec, but omitting Anglophones 
living in Montreal.   Both tests reject the explanation that Anglophones might have been positively 
selected because of the presence of head-offices in Montreal.  In the first test, I found that the unexplained 
component of the gap was larger for the restricted sample than for the full sample:  7.9 points compared 
                                                 
14 Beside positive selection, another possible explanation for similarly skilled Anglophones in the private sector 
earning higher wages in Quebec than outside Quebec could be that the wage determination process in the private 
sector in Quebec was fundamentally different from that outside Quebec, because of different economic environments 
for example.  If this was the case though, we would expect to also observe substantial differences in returns to 
attributes between Francophones in the private sector in Quebec and those outside Quebec, which we do not.  In fact, 
a Wald test that the wage determination process of Francophones in the private sector in Quebec is not statistically 
different from that outside Quebec in 1970 fails to be rejected (p-value of 0.36).   
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with 5.6 points.  In the second test, I found that the compensated mother tongue effect in favour of 
Anglophones was even larger for the restricted sample than for the full sample:  5.2 points compared with 
4.5 points.  The bottom line is that although these tests are consistent with the notion that Anglophones in 
Quebec’s private sector might have been positively selected (and therefore that Francophones might not 
have been discriminated against), they are also consistent with the notion that the labour market where 
Anglophones were the most positively selected in Canada was the private sector in Quebec outside 
Montreal, which is possible but hard to explain.   
 
5.2.2  An unexplained premium for Francophones in 2000 
While, between 1970 and 2000, Francophones became relatively more skilled (e.g., became more 
educated) and many head-offices left Quebec,
15 the major reason though for the drop in the observed wage 
gap during that time period was an increased premium for Francophones as measured by the change in the 
mother tongue effect.  In fact, the latter explains almost three times as much of the drop in the wage gap as 
the former:  23.6 points compared with 9.0 points (see Table 5).  I discuss two possible reasons for the 
increased wage premium for Francophones: an increased demand for French language skills and reverse 
discrimination. 
There is strong evidence that there was an increase in the relative demand for French language 
skills in Quebec’s private sector during that time period, indeed much larger than in the public sector: 
•  The economic returns to bilingualism and the proportion of bilingual workers increased for 
Anglophones, while the economic returns to bilingualism and the proportion of bilingual workers 
decreased for Francophones (see Table 3 and Figure 4).   
•  Between 1970 and 2000, the return to bilingualism for Anglophones in Quebec’s public sector 
increased by about 1 percentage point (although at its peak, that is in 1995, the returns for 
bilingualism had increased by about 10 percentage points) while it increased by 8.2 percentage 
points for those in the private sector (see Figure 4a).  
                                                 
15 See Boulet (1980) for a discussion of the impact of the departures of head offices on the Francophone wage gap in 
Montreal. 
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Table 5:  Elements of the Francophone Wage Gaps over Time:  2000 vs 1970 
   
Quebec  Outside Quebec   
Public  Private  Public  Private 
Observed gap  0.027 
(0.49)
  0.236 
(11.7)
***  0.049 
(1.32)
*  0.102 
(5.79)
*** 
Difference in attributes  0.053 
(2.08)
**  0.090 
(6.56)
***  0.046 
(8.86)
***  0.079 
(26.7)
*** 
  Education effect  0.035 
(4.85)
***  0.088 
(9.75)
***  0.008 
(6.53)
***  0.065 
(25.2)
*** 
  Other effects  0.018 
(0.72)
  0.002 
(0.18)
  0.038 
(7.45)
***  0.015 
(5.34)
*** 
Bilingualism effect  -0.018 
(0.34)
  -0.091 
(3.35)
***  -0.032 
(0.18)




F α ˆ   0.015 
(0.56)
  -0.060 
(5.12)
***  -0.028 
(0.16)




A α ˆ   0.005 
(0.06)
  0.082 
(2.18)
**  0.029 
(0.90)
  0.005 
(0.25)
 
Mother tongue effect  -0.007 
(0.09)
  0.236 
(6.95)
***  0.035 
(0.19)
  0.091 
(1.48)
* 
Compensated mother tongue effect  -0.018 
(0.31)
  0.094 
(3.78)
***  -0.022 
(0.35)
  0.014 
(0.56)
 
Notes: Gap figures are measured in log points.   Absolute t-ratios are in parentheses where * is significant 
at the 10 percent level; ** is significant at the 5 percent level; and *** is significant at the 1 percent level.  
One-tail tests are used. 
 
That the increase in the demand for French language skills in Quebec should have been greater in 
the private sector than in the public sector should come as no surprise.  The first language laws (e.g., Bill 
22 enacted in 1974) were mostly affecting public sector organizations but Francophones had always been 
over-represented in these organizations
16 and as our previous discussion showed, there is no evidence 
supporting the notion that they might have been at a disadvantage in that labour market before these laws 
were enacted.  On the other hand, Bill 101 (enacted in 1977) began imposing much stricter requirements 
on businesses.  For example, while “francization” certificates were optional under Bill 22, they became 
mandatory for firms with more than 50 employees under Bill 101.  And, as we saw earlier, there is strong 
evidence that in the private sector, Quebec Francophones were at a disadvantage relative to similarly 
skilled Anglophones before these laws were passed.  In fact, for many francophone Quebecers at that time, 
                                                 
16 In 1970, the probability of a Francophone Quebecer to work in the public service was about twice as much as that 
of an Anglophone:  10.5 percent versus 5.2 percent.  This no doubt reflects some amount of self-selection.  In fact, 
for a Quebecer, a Probit model shows that being Francophone increased the likelihood of working in the public 
sector by about 20 percent in that year.    
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the objective of these laws (especially Bill 101) was more than to protect the francophone culture; it was 
also to level the playing field between them and Anglophones in the private sector labour market.
17     
Another factor that has probably contributed to increasing returns to French language skills and 
would have had a greater impact in reducing the wage gap in the private sector than in the public sector is 
the increase in Francophone ownership of the Quebec economy.  Vaillancourt, Lemay and Vaillancourt 
(2007) suggest that in fact, this might have had a larger impact on the relative value of language skills than 
the language laws of the 1970s.    This might be accurate, but at the same time, it raises the issue that 
perhaps the increased premium for Francophones in Quebec’s private sector went beyond language 
considerations.
18  In other words, could it be that Quebec’s private sector labour market is returning to a 
situation like the one (arguably) prevailing in 1970, but in reverse?  A situation where it is now 
Francophones who control much of the Quebec economy, but where it is now Anglophones who are 
penalized in the labour market—not because they cannot speak French but because their mother tongue is 
not French.  We can see if there is any evidence of this by comparing how much bilingual Anglophones 
were earning compared to similarly skilled Francophones and by comparing how much Anglophones in 
the private sector in Quebec were earning in 2000 compared to their counterparts outside Quebec. 
As it was the case for Francophones in 1970, in 2000, Anglophones in Quebec’s private sector 
could gain access to the market premium for the other language group by becoming bilingual.  I find that 
holding skills constant, in 2000, a bilingual Anglophone could expect to earn just about the same as a 
unilingual Francophone, but about 4.9 points less than a bilingual Francophone, as measured by the 
compensated mother tongue effect (see Table 3).
19  The cause of this is difficult to pinpoint, but it appears 
                                                 
17 See Shapiro and Stelcner (1997) for a discussion of the objectives of language laws in Quebec. 
 
18 Albouy (2008) is another writer who raises the issue of possible reverse discrimination, although for the whole 
Quebec labour market.   
 
19 One reason why Béland, Forgues and Beaudin (2008) find that in Quebec, unilingual Anglophones earn as much 
as unilingual Francophones and bilingual Anglophones earn as much as bilingual Francophones while I do not is that 
unlike me, they assume the same wage determination process for (i) Francophones and Anglophones (except for a 
fixed effect), and for (ii) the public and the privates sectors.  Two assumptions that are statistically strongly rejected 
in this paper. 
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that it is probably not because Anglophones had poorer unobserved skills than Francophones.
20  Indeed, 
comparing  wages in Quebec with those outside Quebec, I find that in 2000, holding skills constant, 
bilingual Anglophones in the private sector in Quebec were earning significantly less than their 
counterparts outside Quebec (by about 6.4 points), while bilingual Francophones were earning only 
slightly less (by about one point).  Since it is doubtful that Anglophones in Quebec’s private sector had 
that significantly poorer unobserved skills than their counterparts outside Quebec (especially considering 
they had better observed skills) and since there is no evidence that Francophones in this labour market 
were positively selected, it appears that in 2000, Francophones in this labour market might have been 
benefiting from reverse discrimination. 
 
5.3  The Francophone wage gap in the public sector outside Quebec 
The public sector outside Quebec is different from the other labour markets in a very fundamental way—it 
is the only labour market where there is no statistical evidence that could suggest there was Francophone-
Anglophone wage discrimination at any point in time between 1970 and 2000.  Although Anglophones 
generally enjoyed a wage advantage over Francophones in that market, this advantage was entirely due to 
differences in attributes (see Table 4 and Figure 3a) and a higher relative demand for English language 
skills.  In fact, this labour market is the only one among those studied in this paper where controlling for 
skills, bilingual Francophones could generally expect to earn more than unilingual Anglophones and as 
much as bilingual Anglophones (see Table 4 and Figure 5).  It is also interesting to note that in this labour 
market, the bilingualism effect and the mother tongue effect were almost perfectly negatively correlated
21 
which, following the discussion in Section 4.2, should be expected when the mother effect only reflects 
relative demand for a language skill as opposed to other factors including discrimination.   
 
                                                 
20 Another possible explanation for the compensated mother tongue effect being to the advantage of Francophones in 
Quebec’s private sector in 2000 is that bilingual Francophones are not the same as bilingual Anglophones in Quebec; 
they should command higher wages.  However, the magnitude of this advantage being rather large (almost 5 points) 
and the fact that there was no such advantage in 1985, 1990 and 1995 (which would beg the question why there 
would be suddenly such an advantage in 2000) suggests that this is probably not a reasonable explanation. 
     
21 The correlation coefficient between the differential return to bilingualism and the mother tongue effect in the 
public sector outside Quebec is -0.97 with an absolute t-ratio of 8.73.  
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5.3.1  Impact of language laws 
Because most of the research on the Francophone language gap has focussed on the situation in Quebec, 
there has been a tendency to forget that there was a lot of action on the language front outside Quebec 
between the late 1960s and early 1990s.  Most of the language policy changes focused on the public 
sector.  Some landmark policy changes include the followings: 
•  In 1969, the Official Languages Act declares the federal public service officially bilingual.  
•  In 1982, the Charter of Rights and Freedom makes English and French the official languages in 
Canada.
22    
•  In 1982, New Brunswick becomes the first (and so far the only) province to be officially bilingual. 
•  In 1986, Ontario passes the French Language Services Act which guarantees access to provincial 
government services in French in 25 designated areas across the province. 
One consequence of these changes is that the returns to learning French for Anglophones in the 
public sector outside Quebec increased significantly between 1970 and 2000:  from nothing at all to about 
3 percent (see Table 4).  During the same period of time, the proportion of bilingual Anglophones working 
in the public sector almost doubled from 6.6 to 12 percent (see Table 1).   By itself, the combination of 
these two factors increased the relative wage advantage of Anglophones (by 2.8 points), but this was 
exactly offset by the effects of the reduction in the labour market premium for Anglophones as measured 
by the reduction in the mother tongue effect (accounting for a  2.8 points reduction in the wage gap).  This 
suggests that by themselves, the passage of the laws listed above did not have a significant impact on the 
Francophone wage gap in the public sector outside Quebec.  In fact, the drop in the observed wage gap in 
favour of Anglophones from about 5.8 points in 1970 to about 0.9 point in 2000 can be entirely explained 
by the improvement in Francophones’ attributes (see Table 5).   
 
5.4  The Francophone wage gap in the private sector outside Quebec 
                                                 
22 The Charter proffers to English and French preferred status in law over all other languages and provides among 
other things that Canadians have the right to receive services from federal departments and from Crown corporations 
in both official languages and that English and French will have equal status of languages of work within the federal 
public service in areas of the country where there is sufficient demand for services in both official languages. 
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In 1970, the wage situation of Francophones in the private sector outside Quebec was similar to that in 
Quebec (in fact, a test that the wage determination process for Francophones was the same in both labour 
markets fails to be rejected—p-value of 0.35).  The observed wage gap was significantly smaller though 
(13 points compared with 28.7 points).  There are basically three reasons for that: 
•  Francophones working in the private sector were more skilled outside Quebec than in Quebec 
(accounting for 5.1 points of the difference in the gaps);  
•  although the return to bilingualism for Francophones outside Quebec was comparable to that in 
Quebec, there were more bilingual Francophones outside Quebec than in Quebec (accounting for 
3.6 points of the difference in the gaps); and 
•  as noted in Section 5.2.1, the wage premium for Anglophones as measured by the mother tongue 
effect was much greater in Quebec than outside Quebec (accounting for 7.1 points of the 
difference in the gaps). 
As in Quebec, the relative wage situation of Francophones in the private sector outside Quebec 
improved quite significantly between 1970 and 2000, more than in the public sector in fact:  the 
Francophone wage gap in the private sector went from -13.0 points to about -2.8 points, a 10.2-point 
improvement, compared to a 4.9-point improvement in the public sector (see Table 5).  The increase in 
Francophones’ skills explains a large part of the reduction in the gap (about 7.9 points), but the reduction 
in the labour market premium for Anglophones (as measured by the mother tongue effect) explains even 
more (about 9.1 points).  What can explain the reduction in the premium for Anglophones in this labour 
market is unclear.  One can probably rule out though an increase in the relative demand for French skills. 
•  Although language laws outside Quebec have been targeted to the public sector, one could argue 
that they may have had ripple effects on the private sector by increasing the demand for French 
language skills in that sector as well, thus reducing the labour market premium for Anglophones.  
While for the period 1970 to 2000, I observe an increase in the returns to bilingualism for 
Anglophones (plus 0.5 percent) and an increase in the proportion of Anglophones who are 
bilingual in this labour market (plus 0.4 percent), which is consistent with an increase in the 
demand for French skills, the changes are so small that it would be a stretch to ascribe the 9.1   31 
points reduction in the labour market premium for Anglophones to an increase in the demand for 
French skills.     
A reason that could potentially explain the dramatic reduction in the wage premium for 
Anglophones in the private sector outside Quebec but that is not tested in this paper is the assimilation of 
Francophones, especially in Ontario.  In this paper, I have defined Francophones and Anglophones based 
on mother tongue.  However, the results in Grenier (1987) and Lavoie and Saint-Germain (1991) suggest 
that if I had used language spoken at home instead, which would have somewhat controlled for the effects 
of assimilation, could have resulted in significantly smaller Francophone wage gaps outside Quebec. 
 
6.  A further look at the returns to bilingualism 
We have seen that between 1970 and 2000, there were many instances where there was a wage premium 
for a language skill (for example, for French in the public sector in Quebec and for English in the private 
sector outside Quebec).  However, it is important to note that individuals could most of the time enjoy this 
premium if they became bilingual.  In fact, among the four markets studied and the six census years, there 
are only four instances where bilingual individuals could not expect to earn at least as much as similarly 
skilled unilingual individuals, all these instances are found in Quebec:  bilingual Francophones compared 
to unilingual Anglophones in the private sector in Quebec in 1970, and bilingual Anglophones compared 
to unilingual Francophones in the public sector in Quebec in 1980, 1985 and 1990.            
A related issue is how wages compare between bilingual Francophones and bilingual 
Anglophones.  As discussed in Section 4.4.3, according to Vaillancourt, Lemay and Vaillancourt (2007), 
we should expect that Francophones in Quebec should earn more than equivalently skilled bilingual 
Anglophones and vice-versa outside Quebec.  What I find for Quebec is consistent with this view:  
whether in the public or the private sector, bilingual Francophones generally earn more than similarly 
skilled bilingual Anglophones, about 5 percent more on average in 2000 (as measured by the compensated 
mother tongue effect—see Figure 5 and Table 3).  On the other hand, outside Quebec, I find that there is 
no statistically significant difference between the earnings of bilingual Francophones and those of 
equivalently skilled bilingual Anglophones (if anything, there is a small advantage for bilingual   32 
Francophones).  A possible explanation for this is that bilingual Francophones outside Quebec are on 
average much more fluent in English than bilingual Anglophones in Quebec are fluent in French.  Another 
possible explanation is that there might currently be more tolerance outside Quebec for individuals who do 
not perfectly speak the language of the majority.  I am not aware of any of these explanations having been 
seriously statistically tested. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
It is well known that the wage determination process greatly differs between the public sector and the 
private sector.  Taking this into account and using a variant of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method 
help paint a more accurate picture of the sources and evolution of the Francophone wage gap in Quebec 
and outside Quebec.     
In 1970, Francophones earned less than Anglophones in all labour markets except the public 
sector in Quebec.  Some of this was due to Francophones’s attributes (e.g., lack of education), but most of 
it was due to a labour market premium for Anglophones.  In the public and private sectors outside Quebec, 
this premium probably only reflected a high relative demand for English language skills:  unilingual 
Francophones were earning less than equivalently skilled unilingual Anglophones in these markets, but 
bilingual Francophones were earning as much as bilingual Anglophones.   
On the other hand, in Quebec’s private sector in 1970, the wage premium for Anglophones may 
have been going beyond language skill considerations, as bilingual Francophones were earning 
significantly less than equivalently skilled unilingual and bilingual Anglophones.  Another piece of 
evidence to that effect is that Anglophones in that labour market seem to have been overpaid relative to 
their counterparts outside Quebec. 
  The Francophone wage gap closed dramatically between 1970 and 2000. A lot has been said 
about the role that education and the acquisition of other skills by Francophones played in closing this 
gap.  However, I find that the reduction in the labour market premium for Anglophones played an even 
greater role, especially in the private sector where this premium was the largest in the first place.  It is   33 
difficult to accurately identify the causes of the reduction in the premium for Anglophones, but language 
laws probably had a significant impact, especially in the private sector in Quebec. 
  By 2000, it appears that the wage premium for Anglophones had vanished in all sectors both in 
and outside Quebec.  However, it had turned into a premium for Francophones in the private sector in 
Quebec.  And it is unclear that this premium was based on language considerations alone:  holding skills 
constant, Anglophones in this sector were earning less than their counterparts outside Quebec; and 
although bilingual Anglophones were earning about the same as unilingual Francophones, they were 
earning significantly less than bilingual Francophones (unlike in previous years where they were earning 
about the same).   
The situation in Quebec’s private sector in 2000 is thus very similar to the one prevailing in 1970, 
but in reverse.  This raises the issue that language policy in Quebec (i.e., Bill 101) may have been having 
an unintended effect:  it may be resulting in reverse discrimination in the private sector.  In fact, I find as 
much evidence of wage discrimination against Anglophones in Quebec’s private sector in 2000 as I find 
there was against Francophones in 1970. 
Arguably the most unexpected result of this study though is that while I did not find any evidence 
consistent with language based wage discrimination in either the public sector or the private sector outside 
Quebec, I found some in Quebec’s public sector for every year studied except 1995.
23  In fact, the 
unexplained wage premium for Francophones in this labour market is possibly the major reason why 
unlike in any other labour market studied, there was essentially no wage gap in that market between 1970 
and 2000.  
All of this makes me conclude that if at this juncture, there is a potential problem on the wage-
language front in Canada, then it is in Quebec and it lies with the treatment of Anglophones.  While the 
evidence provided in this paper to this effect is by no means irrefutable and that it may be difficult for 
some to have a lot of sympathy for Anglophones in Quebec—given that they still earn more on average 
than Francophones and that there is anecdotal evidence that they can be very successful without learning 
                                                 
23 Following our discussion in Section 2 on the limitation of our empirical definition of public sector, this result 
probably reflects more the situation in the provincial and local public sectors in Quebec, than in the federal public 
sector in Quebec.    
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any French, the high economic cost of discrimination—especially against an ethnic group that is highly 
skilled and very mobile—makes it imperative that policymakers closely monitor the situation.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1:  Regression Coefficients† 
(Quebec—Public Sector) 
 
1970  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000   
Coef.  |t|  Coef.  |t|  Coef.  |t|  Coef.  |t|  Coef.  |t|  Coef.  |t| 
Anglophones 
Constant  1.571   8.12  2.227    11.1    1.551    6.89    1.388   6.24    1.977    7.83    1.651   7.47  
Bilingual  .023     0.33  .042    0.94    -.073    1.16    .080     1.29    .125    2.61    .018   0.34   
Education  .078    6.67  .035   3.52    .071   7.21    .063    5.51    .035    3.18    .046   4.79   
Experience  .058   5.67  .056      6.51    .055    5.94    .069   6.39    .074   6.99    .060    5.59   
Experience
2  -.001    4.90  -.001    5.96    -.001    4.19    -.001    4.46    -.001       5.42    -.001   4.03   
Immigrant  .026    0.27  -.024    0.36    -.059    1.05    .019    0.25    -.055    1.02    -.049    0.71   
CMA  -.044   -0.72  -.006    0.09    .054    0.76    -.016    0.24    -.101    1.41    .029    0.45   
Occup. 1  -.088    -1.03  -.101    1.12    -.042    0.35    -.160   1.10    -.309    2.37     .069    0.45   
Occup. 2  -.281   2.60  -.157    1.22    -.584    3.19    -.091    0.49    -.317   2.71   -.003   0.02   
Occup. 3  -.129    1.39  -.039    0.44    -.179    2.61    -.130    1.92    -.273    2.25    -.152    0.91   
Occup. 4  -.403   2.26  -.218    2.03    -.213   2.13    -.180    1.59    -.522    4.21    -.195    1.24   
Occup. 5  -.010    0.91  -.436    4.60    -.221    1.97    -.254   2.23    -.553   3.90    -.345   2.16   
Occup. 6  -.227    0.98  -.323    3.38    -.187    2.01    -.141    1.91    -.947    2.80    -.576   4.15   
Occup. 7  -.652     2.29  -1.16    12.6    -.009    0.07    .062    0.29    -.231   1.90    .050   0.32   
Occup. 8  -.186       1.02  -.299    2.71    -.314    2.50    -.380   1.29    -.174    1.19    .020   0.12   
Occup. 9      -.364    2.76    -.094    0.58    -.287    1.67    -.229    1.46    .039    0.22   
Occup. 10      -.463   3.86    -.294    1.95    -.078    0.31           
Occup. 11      -.549    3.54        -.116    0.83           
Francophones 
Constant  1.943       19.2  2.454  37.5   1.880    33.3    1.868   36.5    2.057    37.8    2.029    36.7   
Bilingual  .083     3.34  .050   3.68     .040   3.00    .064   6.27    .042    3.67    .067    5.73   
Education  .058   11.2  .040    11.2    .052     17.8    .055   20.3    .047       17.7    .042    14.8   
Experience  .035    9.79  .034   15.8  .044     19.3    .042   22.2    .038   17.0  .039    16.5  
Experience
2  -.001   7.80  -.001    13.2    -.001    13.5    -.001   15.0    -.000    10.5    -.001   10.2  
Immigrant  -.113    1.37  -.041   1.00    -.068    1.68    -.037   1.12    -.069    1.92    -.089   2.25   
CMA  -.068   3.11  -.034   2.43    .052     3.91    .015   1.40    -.010    0.82    .069   5.46   
Occup. 1  .018    0.39  -.051  1.93    -.039    1.47    -.024    1.34    -.137   4.30   -.123   3.93   
Occup. 2  -.211    5.17  -.024    0.61    -.063    1.88    -.040   1.65    -.112   3.66    -.010   3.09   
Occup. 3  -.073    1.75  -.057    2.74    -.063    2.97    -.030   1.94    -.150   4.63    -.182   5.37   
Occup. 4  -.147   1.11  -.297    9.88    -.188    6.62    -.149   6.14    -.322      10.5  -.327    10.3  
Occup. 5  -.180    3.22  -.375    16.0  -.239    9.38    -.211   10.4    -.428   12.9    -.504   14.3  
Occup. 6  -.098     1.71  -.277    12.4    -.125    5.74    -.072   4.02    -.427   5.64    -.342    3.58   
Occup. 7  -.107    2.06  -.152    3.57    -.180    4.52    -.201    2.68    -.039    1.19    -.041      1.21  
Occup. 8  -.145    2.31  -.348    10.4    -.139    3.53    -.097   3.90    -.106    3.25    -.070   2.11   
Occup. 9      -.291    10.3    -.146    2.85    -.092   3.66    -.267    6.97  -.247    5.15   
Occup. 10      -.368    9.57    -.220    6.41    -.123    2.80           
Occup. 11      -.536    11.3        -.141    5.22           
  




1970  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000   
Coef.  |t|  Coef.  |t|  Coef.  |t|  Coef.  |t|  Coef.  |t|  Coef.  |t| 
Anglophones 
Constant  2.066    28.4  2.096    27.6    1.946    17.9    1.877    21.6    1.992   13.8   1.911   13.0 
Bilingual  -.026    1.33  .017    0.77      .000    0.01    -.005    0.20    .088    2.90    .055    1.74   
Education  .056    15.1  .054      13.0    .042    7.24    .056    12.6    .046    8.05    .055   9.60   
Experience  .046    16.6  .043    14.4    .058   13.4    .046    13.4    .058   13.6    .038   8.58   
Experience
2  -.001    12.7  -.001    10.1    -.001    9.07    -.001    8.39    -.001    9.33    -.001   4.87   
Immigrant  -.090    3.71  -.107    4.12    -.127    3.67    -.080    2.54    -.102    2.98    -.126    3.32   
CMA  .012   0.63  -.078    2.81    .077    2.04    .038    1.36    -.031    0.80    .061   1.64   
Occup. 1  -.099   2.96  -.075   1.91    -.078    1.77    -.011    0.32    -.160   1.73    -.091   1.00   
Occup. 2  -.373    11.7  -.116   0.95    -.258   1.38    -.160    1.10    -.275    2.22    -.332    2.31   
Occup. 3  -.725    13.1  -.108    1.16    -.172    0.83    .149    0.52    -.523    5.32    -.373    3.93   
Occup. 4  -1.19  -9.78  -.663   3.12    -.723   3.25    -.201   1.25    -.573    6.11    -.513   5.52   
Occup. 5  -.368    10.7  -.306    8.98    -.312    8.19    -.314    9.75    -.791    7.81    -.617    6.15   
Occup. 6  -.255    5.55  -.548   10.1    -.670    9.65    -.616    12.6    -.747    6.66    -.632   5.70   
Occup. 7  -.484   7.36  -.075    0.61    -.309    7.58    -.801    6.98    -.220    2.33    -.119   1.30   
Occup. 8  -.377   9.01  -.289    9.04    -.137    1.88    -.288    8.14    -.721      5.14    -.779    6.75   
Occup. 9      -.225    4.02    -.292   3.75    -.227    4.21    -.410    4.25    -.405    4.28   
Occup. 10      -.241   4.49    -.384    6.92    -.298    5.90           
Occup. 11      -.253    6.16        -.309    7.00           
Francophones 
Constant  2.038    51.9  2.230    74.7    1.890    53.0    2.027    71.2    1.963    39.3    2.252   54.7  
Bilingual  .118    12.5  .059     7.67    .048        5.33    .062     8.79    .033     4.40    .058   8.16   
Education  .043    21.0  .041     24.8   .045     23.8    .044     27.9    .043     27.6    .038   27.7  
Experience  .035   25.0  .037    34.6   .049    40.2    .040     39.7    .042    37.4    .037    36.0 
Experience
2  -.001    20.7  -.001    24.7    -.001    28.5    -.001   26.3    -.001    23.0  -.000    21.2  
Immigrant  -.045    1.89  -.146    5.64    -.164    4.84    -.093    3.48    -.058    2.00    -.108    4.25   
CMA  -.018   1.98  -.059    7.99    .063    7.45    .050    7.43    .023     3.17    .042       6.08   
Occup. 1  -.042    1.49  .015         0.80    -.009    0.47    -.051    3.87    -.038    0.91    -.198   5.87   
Occup. 2  -.299    13.9  .038     0.71    -.173    2.90    -.146    2.34    -.079    1.66    -.259   6.57   
Occup. 3  -.558   20.1  -.012    0.23    -.167    0.92    -.221    2.28    -.210    4.98    -.405    11.9   
Occup. 4  -.796    8.64  -.269    2.59    -.288    3.35    -.189    4.02    -.298    7.12    -.519   15.4   
Occup. 5  -.257   11.7  -.274    18.9    -.282    17.9    -.343    29.0    -.446    10.5    -.622   18.0 
Occup. 6  -.117   4.90  -.536    24.1    -.532    22.0    -.560    32.9    -.458    10.2    -.649   17.9   
Occup. 7  -.356    13.7  .027     0.91   -.199    12.8    -.705    19.3    -.146    3.43    -.262    7.53   
Occup. 8  -.207    8.80  -.203    14.4    -.000    0.00    -.224    19.3    -.387    8.00    -.593   13.6 
Occup. 9      -.040    2.33    -.245    12.3    -.074    5.32    -.179    4.29    -.368   10.9   
Occup. 10      -.269    14.7    -.276    13.1    -.336    20.5           
Occup. 11      -.239    13.0        -.214     14.0           
        38 
Regression Coefficients 
(Outside Quebec—Public Sector) 
 
1970  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000   
Coef.  |t|  Coef.  |t|  Coef.  |t|  Coef.  |t|  Coef.  |t|  Coef.  |t| 
Anglophones 
Constant  1.914    33.2  2.312   58.6    1.86    51.2    1.872   58.8    1.942    45.3    1.986    42.4   
Maritimes  -.096    5.26  -.052    4.18    -.016    1.26    -.051    5.36    -.116    10.9    -.110    8.81   
Prairies  -.097   4.26  .009          0.61    .005    0.32    -.095    8.23    -.098    8.42    -.090    6.60   
Alberta  -.084    3.90  .025    1.89    .011   0.77    -.057    5.60    -.100    8.40    -.059    4.94   
B.C.  -.035    1.73  .074   6.20    -.007    0.56    -.051    5.06    .024    2.41    -.005    0.45   
Bilingual   .000   0.01  .027    1.79    .040    2.72    .021   1.89    .018    1.73    .029    2.26   
Education  .064    23.4  .039   17.7    .051    27.6    .053    30.5    .046    24.3    .046    20.9  
Experience  .042    19.4  .040    27.3    .051    32.7    .048   37.3    .042   24.9   .044   26.7  
Experience
2  -.001   15.2  -.001    21.3    -.001    24.2    -.001    26.2    -.001    16.1    -.001     17.9   
Immigrant  -.032    1.62  -.009      0.69  -.041   3.16    -.014   1.34    -.032    2.66    .000    0.03   
CMA  -.043    -1.86  -.049   5.80    .058    6.09    .053    7.61    .052    7.00    .058    6.92   
Occup. 1  -.021    0.83  -.070    4.48    -.047    2.88    -.035    2.72    -.025       1.03    -.107    4.45   
Occup. 2  -.281    10.8  -.141   6.25    -.165    7.13    -.142    8.17    -.043   1.81    -.180    7.55   
Occup. 3  -.152  7.17  -.070   5.53    -.084    6.21    -.080    7.59    -.100   3.97    -.228    9.00   
Occup. 4  -.309    5.31  -.284   11.5    -.207    7.90    -.146   7.21    -.220    8.79    -.309    12.2  
Occup. 5  -.167  4.34  -.349    19.9    -.292    14.8    -.231   15.1   -.337   12.9    -.496    18.5   
Occup. 6  -.246   5.11  -.212   15.7   -.117    8.87    -.079   7.50    -.259    7.58    -.361    9.25   
Occup. 7  -.233    5.66  -.437    4.85    -.149    5.91    -.335   11.3    .038    1.55    -.049    1.97   
Occup. 8  -.195    6.69  -.199    9.18    -.132    4.92    -.160    7.86    -.032    1.28    -.063    2.58   
Occup. 9      -.255   11.3    -.327    8.81    -.191    9.87    -.166   5.37    -.293    8.63   
Occup. 10      -.295   9.15    -.255    12.8    -.155    6.11           
Occup. 11      -.503    22.3        -.254   15.0           
Francophones 
Constant  1.541         6.26  2.301    14.6    1.944    15.0    1.821    19.5    1.655    10.4    2.158   13.74   
Maritimes  -.160   2.82  -.023    0.64    -.090    2.18    -.096    3.90    -.090    2.89    -.098    3.01    
Prairies  -.092    -1.05  .042         0.83    -.058    1.11    -.065    1.77    -.052   1.37    -.135    2.77    
Alberta  -.113    1.45  -.046    0.69    -.061    1.01    -.003   0.07    -.191   3.71    .0253    0.42    
B.C.  -.253    2.23  .075         1.42    -.053    0.72    -.019    0.44    -.135   1.92    -.114    1.65    
Bilingual  .092   0.58  .132         2.30   -.031    0.43    .087    2.01    .134    1.90    .064    0.73    
Education  .081   9.45  .038   4.89    .057   8.80    .056    12.0   .057    11.3    .048   7.21    
Experience  .053    6.62  .037    8.09    .050    9.67    .045    13.3    .044    7.89    .029     6.27    
Experience
2  -.001     5.04  -.001    6.77    -.001    7.11    -.001    9.45    -.001    5.20    -.000    3.39    
Immigrant  -.265    1.20  -.000    0.00  -.060    1.01    -.057   1.07    -.253    3.34    -.139    2.03    
CMA  -.083   0.87  -.091    2.74  .055    1.60   -.028    1.27    .045    1.60    .077    2.79    
Occup. 1  -.129    1.47  -.145    2.52  -.092    1.67    -.006    0.14    -.070    0.70    -.242    2.86    
Occup. 2  -.287    4.15  -.122    1.87    -.166    2.05    -.036   0.73    .004    0.04    -.323    3.99    
Occup. 3  -.076    1.18  -.111    2.03    -.133    2.67    -.071    1.84    -.077    0.75    -.230     2.93    
Occup. 4  -.482   2.47  -.422    5.72    -.316   3.99    -.203   3.37    -.145   1.50    -.450       5.56    
Occup. 5  -.054   0.31  -.401    6.47    -.339    5.77    -.186   4.86   -.393   3.71    -.570    6.96    
Occup. 6  -.132    1.14  -.303    5.95    -.170    3.65    -.087   2.63    -.023    0.16    -.349    2.22    
Occup. 7  -.041    0.30  -.381    3.23    -.113   1.14    -.236    2.32    .032    0.34    -.110    1.40    
Occup. 8  -.210    2.11  -.286    4.86    -.154    1.93    -.135    2.00    -.008   0.08    -.129    1.62    
Occup. 9      -.337    4.17    -.242   2.28    -.248    4.53    -.146    1.31    -.447    3.73    
Occup. 10      -.288   3.40    -.266    3.37    -.061   0.70           
Occup. 11      -.611    6.27        -.119    3.07           
       39 
  
Regression Coefficients 
(Outside Quebec—Private Sector) 
 
1970  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000   
Coef.  |t|  Coef.  |t|  Coef.  |t|  Coef.  |t|  Coef.  |t|  Coef.  |t| 
Anglophones 
Constant  2.206  83.5    .200    112   1.967    94.6    2.040          112  2.255    78.0    2.186    87.1   
Maritimes  -.264  23.0  -.109    13.4    -.116   13.0  -.141    19.7    -.171    20.8    -.190    24.4   
Prairies  -.146  11.6  -.038    4.36    -.069    7.35    -.128    17.9    -.138    17.3    -.167    21.9   
Alberta  -.038     3.19  .100    13.5    .061    7.52    -.050    8.08    -.044    6.39    -.026    4.25   
B.C.  .052      5.48    .143    21.4    .079    10.3    .031    5.44    .058    9.46    .018    2.89   
Bilingual  .005   0.27  .015     1.32   .012    0.95    .011    1.11  .012    1.04    .009    0.92   
Education  .048    36.8  .045   40.0    .045   40.7    .046      44.5    .041    36.6    .047    44.9   
Experience  .039    41.6  .040    56.4    .051    64.0    .045    67.7    .048   64.7    .045    64.2   
Experience
2  -.001   32.4  -.001    40.4    -.001    45.3   -.001    45.6    -.001    42.9    -.001    41.4   
Immigrant  -.020  2.31  -.057    7.77    -.074    9.24    -.054    8.15    -.065   8.77    -.070    9.24   
CMA  -.028    3.34  -.032     6.44    .063    11.2    .072    16.2    .048   9.99    .068    14.8  
Occup. 1  -.125   7.56  -.049    4.88    -.028    2.78    -.026    3.27    -.271    12.6   -.229   13.1   
Occup. 2  -.365  26.4  -.221   5.40    -.190    5.16    -.073    2.74    -.369    15.4    -.333    15.5   
Occup. 3  -.604   32.0  -.123    1.84  -.212    2.93    -.177    3.59    -.436    20.2    -.420    23.8   
Occup. 4  -.883  23.0  -.289    7.48   -.132    3.24    -.159    5.31    -.553    25.9    -.568    32.9   
Occup. 5  -.309  21.8  -.266     30.7    -.314    35.4    -.293    41.4    -.728    32.3    -.712    38.7   
Occup. 6  -.218  13.6  -.547    33.5    -.610    40.8    -.582    48.6    -.637    27.8    -.605    31.8   
Occup. 7  -.394  22.8  -.063    3.52    -.209    24.1    -.715    37.9    -.353    16.3    -.310    17.7   
Occup. 8  -.308  20.7  -.193   22.7    -.216    19.7    -.208    30.0    -.804    26.4    -.786    27.8   
Occup. 9      -.146    14.4    -.307    24.6   -.176    21.0    -.420    19.7    -.412    23.8  
Occup. 10      -.245   20.8    -.354    31.3    -.303    31.1         
Occup. 11      -.278    25.9        -.230    27.3           
Francophones 
Constant  2.140     15.9  2.441    27.6   2.234    24.2    2.156    25.8    2.125    16.2    2.276    20.6   
Maritimes  -.346    9.77  -.172    7.14    -.135    4.96    -.159   6.85    -.219    8.34    -.240    10.1   
Prairies  -.215   5.05  .008    0.21    -.170    4.26    -.182    5.25    -.128    3.03    -.111        2.96   
Alberta  -.125    2.24  .014    0.38   .070     1.57    -.078    2.19    -.088    2.44    -.068    2.22   
B.C.  .101   2.02  .172    4.23    .008     0.14   -.015    0.40    -.055    1.28    .010     0.27   
Bilingual  .121    2.28  .096    3.30    .054     1.43    .033    0.98    .053      1.49    .048     1.34   
Education  .038    6.64  .026   5.57    .029     6.34    .034    7.13    .039    7.85    .041     8.81  
Experience  .038      9.32  .032   11.3    .043     13.2   .041    15.7    .044     14.3    .034     12.3   
Experience
2  -.001  7.58  -.000    8.07    -.001        9.05    -.001    10.7    -.001    9.05    -.000    6.98   
Immigrant  -.112   1.45  -.010   0.22    .029     0.52    -.021    0.36    -.074    1.27    -.111    2.33   
CMA  -.059    1.49  -.009    0.40    .045     1.80    .085    4.35    .021     0.93    .062     2.89   
Occup. 1  .017      0.17  -.073    1.39    .046    0.97    -.036    0.90    -.112    1.12    -.134    1.84   
Occup. 2  -.304   3.54  .040    0.18    -.102    0.58    .237    2.28    -.179    1.69    -.378    4.06   
Occup. 3  -.572    6.06  -.272    1.25    .127     0.50    -.091   0.59    -.317   3.19    -.404    5.41   
Occup. 4  -.824   5.31  -.206     1.79    -.177    0.98    -.307    2.46    -.379    3.88    -.495    6.80   
Occup. 5  -.193  2.27  -.387    9.17    -.368    8.10    -.268    8.32    -.530    5.26    -.583    7.56   
Occup. 6  -.138   1.55  -.609    9.95    -.642    9.46    -.545    10.6    -.404    3.89    -.444    5.57   
Occup. 7  -.369   4.03  -.009      0.19    -.237    5.59    -.664    7.20    -.314    3.15    -.305    4.09   
Occup. 8  -.196      2.23  -.231     5.84    -.286    5.85    -.179    6.00    -.701    5.61    -.751    6.32   
Occup. 9      -.187    4.12    -.262    5.01    -.151    4.52    -.302    3.06    -.310    4.27   
Occup. 10      -.289   5.97    -.456    8.07    -.284    6.68           
Occup. 11      -.290     5.89        -.172    4.65           †Occupation groupings vary from census year to census year depending on the parameters of the censuses 
and the sample sizes. 
    1970  1980  1985  1990  1995 and 2000 
  Reference 
category 
Management  Management  Management  Management  Senior 
management, 
Health 






















  Occup. 3  Services  Teaching  Teaching  Teaching  Administration, 
Social Sciences, 
Manufacturing 





  Occup. 5  Processing, 
Machining 
Clerical, Sales  Clerical, Sales  Clerical, Sales  Chefs, Child care, 
Travel 
  Occup. 6  Construction  Services  Services  Services  Retail, Primary 
  Occup. 7  Transportation  Other primary  Processing, 
Machining 
Farming  Other mgmt. 








  Occup. 9    Construction  Transportation  Construction  Wholesale, Other 
trades 
  Occup. 10    Transportation  Other 
occupations  
Transportation   
  Occup. 11    Other 
occupations  
  Other 
occupations  
 
 
 